Philosophische Untersuchungen [Pdf/E–pub]

Philosophische Untersuchungen

characters ´ PDF, eBook or Kindle ePUB ree ✓ Ludwig Wittgenstein

At I could imagine but he still ends up being of a behaviorist than I likeWhat do I mean by behaviorism Wittgenstein is a skeptic with regard to meaning in the sense that he does not think that meaning is something we can look inside of ourselves introspect to discover As I summarized above Wittgenstein believes that meaning is revealed by the use of a word in social interactions in other words through language games the behavior of the people using the wordConsider words or what we usually think of as mental phenomena thinking believing remembering knowing and the like How can you tell if someone knows that Paris is in France If you ask him he gives you the right answer If he looks inside of his mind must there be the knowledge that Paris is in France Not necessarily He might not even be thinking of that and even if he were subvocalizing Paris is in France is there a mental uality that distinguishes that as knowing Thus Wittgenstein gives a ormidable argument that knowing consists not in any mental phenomenon but in the behavior of giving the right answer In making this argument Wittgenstein has not avoided introspection as a techniue On the contrary he has used it extensively Even when he asks us to imagine a certain language game we are imagining a behavior but we are using introspection to do it Wittgenstein is a master of asking the rhetorical uestion which reveals how we use a particular word in social interactions but each rhetorical uestion reuires a looking into ourselves and our experiencesWittgenstein is not ultimately hostile to our looking into ourselves in Right Turns: From Liberal Activist to Conservative Champion in 35 Unconventional Lessons fact I think he would regard it as aruitful part of life But his basic point is that only when our introspected observations can be validated by being part of our interactions with other people our language games only then can the words have consistent and usable meaningsMy uibble with this is that introspection sometimes yields results than Wittgenstein is prepared to recognize As just one example Wittgenstein asks how do we judge time He says that we might sit Politically Incorrect for a while and say Aboutive minutes have passed and we may be right He says that there is no introspectable experience of time passing or of measuring time But I am not sure if that is right Paul Churchland talks about a pulsing of neuronic signals Beyond Varallan from the center of the brain to the perimeter and back again This means that our sensory processing echoes and reverberates with these pulses and gives us a sense of time passing If we attend to the experience of this we may be able to discriminate what makes us sensitive to the passage of time and we may be able to do this in a way which can be validated by other people If we are able to make these discriminations through introspection before the science is available to explain it is it still meaningless That is my rhetorical uestion Exasperating but worth itThe syntax of the Investigations has a jaggedly Asperger seel to it Too often Wittgenstein sounds like a malfunctioning android jabbering its core protocols to itself pacing in rantic circles waving its arms in a vexed Philosophy is the sickness and I m the cure manner The loathsome blend of pedantry and vagueness throughout Part 1 hectoring in tone nebulous in definition can be maddening As a communicator Wittgenstein often ranks with Kant or Heidegger pitiless kraut magi of galling opacity Your cognitive muscles will eel the burn Part 2 is rather less punishing with enticing stimulants on nearly every page while large swaths of Part 1 are a morale stunting crawl through banks of og What s the dealKeep in mind that PI is a posthumous medley of notes and ragments that never benefitted Dona Flor from ainal rigorous copyedit I ve also been told that the recent 2009 translation by Peter Hacker and Joachim Schulte is less stodgy and peeving than the classic Anscombe version An editor might be tempted to abridge Part 1 to a Best Of showcase Rocker Babies Wear Jeans for non academics but the moments of profundity strewn throughout that portion 75% of the book probably reuire the groundwork of the wearyingragments to shore up Wittgenstein s visionSo what s the payoff Well a panoptic voyage into speech and semantics that s both rousing emancipatory and at times painfully obvious The latter as we ve washed ashore in a postphilosophical age that takes so much of Wittgenstein or granted but also because his expository style can read like an amnesiac head trauma patient attempting to reconstruct language use rom scratch poking and prodding at kindergarten level grammar to explore how situational semantics weaves and bends through our intricately embodied moment to moment actualities all tempered by an uneasy nostalgia Sono with Visits from the Seventh for positivist puzzles boxed in the attic radiant antiues that gave so muchaux luster to our mental livesWittgenstein wants us to detox to scrape out the arterial plaue of Remarkable Creatures false problems Fundamental confusions about language use heears have staggered us into an ersatz World Of Epistemic Mazes And of epistemic mazes and "Obstacle Courses A Bad Philip "courses a bad Philip Dick novel of cloying simulacra PI aims to unjack us rom this Matrix wrench us back down into our bodies a homecoming to and abashed rediscovery of the everyday Though Darwin is never mentioned in PI Wittgenstein s corrosive presence in the philosophical canon is comparable to evolutionary models preempting theological sleight of hand Post theist armchair philosophy in Wittgenstein s eyes is still beholden to the system erecting wankfest of priestly theorizing To reiterate a amiliar story we ve displaced ancient Platonic illusions into the matrices of rationalist projects which refuse to accept that our universe is non linguistic and so can never be mirrored or simulated by our anthropic earthbound syntax Our lives are short and our knowledge is crimped and narrow It s best we have the humility to concede our limits pending some dubious self immolating transhumanist upgrade As with Kant wisdom often means knowing what we can t do 426 A picture is conjured up which seems to Heroes Adrift (Hero, fix the sense unambiguously The actual use compared with that suggested by the picture seems like something muddied Here again we get the same thing as in set theory theorm of expression we use seems to have been designed Chuck and Danielle for a god who knows what we cannot know he sees the whole of each of those infinite series and he sees into human consciousness For us of course theseorms of expression are like pontificals which we may put on but cannot do much with since we lack the effective power that would give these vestments meaning and purpose In the actual use of expressions we make detours we go by side roads We see the straight highway before us but OF COURSE WE CANNOT USE IT BECAUSE IT IS course we cannot use it because it is closed pg 108 Blackwell 2001To prime yourself download the two part Partially Examined Life podcast Wittgenstein on Language Episode 55 15307 56 15301 roundtable discussion throughout is very good My only niggle pertains to one of the participants bungling the renowned Piero Sraffa anecdote mistakenly attributing it to GE Moore The act that the remaining scholars claim never to have heard of it is eually strange It s at least as Dogs Behaving Badly: An A-Z Guide to Understanding and Curing Behavorial Problems in Dogs famous as the Karl Popperireplace poker episode Wittgenstein even thanks Sraffa in his Preface Oh wellPHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS translated by GEM AnscombeA Gray Bishop for substantive vision and historical importance Cor expository claritySpecial bonus trackWas Wittgenstein Right by Paul Horwich NYU The Stone New York Times Opinionator blog 3313. Mbered or ease of referenceNew detailed editorial endnotes explain decisions of translators and identify references and allusions in Wittgenstein's original textNow eatures new essays on the history of the Philosophical Investigations and the problems of translating Wittgenstein’s text. Etations alter the sensations themselves To illustrate this Wittgenstein uses perhaps the uniest example in all of philosophy the duck rabbit As you can see whether you interpret this conglomeration of shapes lines and spaces as a rabbit or a duck depends on your interpretation and if you had never seen a duck or a rabbit in your life the picture would look rather strange Ernst Gombrich summed up this point uite nicely in his Story of Art If we look out of the window we can see the view in a thousand different ways Which of them is our sense impression The point of all this is that trying to make propositions about sense impressions is like trying to hit a moving target since you only see something a certain way because of certain beliefs or experiences you already hold The argument about inner eelings is eually weak For example when we learned the word pain did someone somehow point to the Liar feeling and name it Clearly that s impossible What actually happens is that we or someone else exhibited normal behavioral manifestations of pain crying moaning tearing clutching the afflicted area The word pain then is used at least originally to refer to pain behavior and we later use the word pain as a replacementor our infantile pain behavior instead of moaning and clutching our arm we tell someone we have a pain and that it s in our arm This shows that the internal referent of the word pain is not Noir fundamental to its meaning but is derivative of itsundamental public use This may seem trivial but this line of argument is a powerful attack on the entire Cartesian tradition Let me give you an example Ren Descartes Renovate: Changing Who You Are by Loving Where You Are famously sat in his room and then tried to doubt the whole world He then got down to his own ego and tried to build the work back uprom there This line of thought places the individual at the center of the epistemological uestion and makes all other phenomena derivative of the Gaffer fundamental subjective experience of certainty But let us as Wittgenstein advises examine the normal use of the word to know You say I know Tom or I know American history If someone asked you What makes you say you know Tom and American history you might say something like I can pick Tom sace out of a crowd or I could pass a history test Already you are giving social criteria Circumstantial Evidence for what it means to know Inact the word to know presupposes the ability to verify something with something that is not yourself You would never verify something you remember by pointing to another thing you remember that would be absurd since your memory is the thing being tested Instead you indicate an independent criterion Lone Star Justice: The First Century of the Texas Rangers for determining whether or not you know something The social test of knowledge is also explicit in science since experiments must be repeatable and communicable if a scientist said I know this but I my can t prove it once that would not be science So because knowing anything apparently reuires some kind of social confirmation the Cartesian project ofounding knowledge on subjective experience is doomed rom the start Knowing anything reuires at least two people since you couldn t know if you were right or wrong without some kind of social confirmation Wittgenstein brings this home with his discussion of private language Let s say you had a eeling that nobody has told you how to name As a result you suspect that this A Chicken in Every Yard: The Urban Farm Store's Guide to Chicken Keeping feeling is uniue to yourself and so you create your own nameor it Every time you have the Island of the Lost Horses (Dora and Friends) feeling you apply this made up name to it But how do you know if you re using the name correctly How do you know that every time you use your private name you are referring to the sameeeling You can t check it against your memory since your memory is the very thing being doubted You can t ask somebody else because nobody else knows this name or has this sensation Therefore merely thinking you re using the name consistently and actually using the name consistently would be indistinguishable experiences You could never really know Although Wittgenstein s views changed dramatically Summer Meditations from the early to the late phase of his career you can see some intriguing similarities One main current of Wittgenstein s thought is that all philosophical problems resultrom the misuse of "Language Compare This Statement "Compare this statement the Tractatus All philosophy is Critiue of language with this God Said, Ha!: A Memoir from the Investigations Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language In both works Wittgenstein is convinced that philosophical problems only arise because of the misuses of language that philosophers either attempt to say the unsayable or confuse the rules of one language game with another producing nonsense I cannot say I ve thought through Wittgenstein s pointsully enough to say whether I agree or disagree with them But whether wrong or right Wittgenstein already has the ultimate merit of any philosopher provoking thought about undamental uestions And even if he was wrong about everything his books would be worth reading or the writing alone Reading Wittgenstein can be very much like taking straight shots of vodka it burns on the way down it addles your brain it is On the Right Side of a Dream forceful and overwhelming but after all the pain and toil the end result is pleasant elation This is theirst work by Wittgenstein I ve ever read I ve been terrified of him or years truth be told I ve read a biography by WW Bartley III wouldn t you love to be the third I would stick the three I s on the end of my name too if I was but unfortunately I m only Trevor the Second The main memory I have of that book is of Wittgenstein waiting to be captured "In WWI And Him Humming "WWI and him humming second movement of Beethoven s Seventh That has always been one of my all time avourite pieces of music and if I was ever in a machine gun nest about to be captured or potentially killed by the enemy I could think of no better piece of music to be humming The Operation Iceberg : The Invasion and Conquest of Okinawa in World War II fear has comerom the Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi's Long Journey to Triumph in Iraq fact Wittgenstein is known as being off the scale brilliant And so I just assumed he would also be too hard to read with him picking out distinctions I wouldn t be able to see even after he had held them to the light and turned them aboutThis book As a philosopher Wittgenstein isn t terribly systematic rather shockingor an analytic thinker I would argue that he s an original using analytic thought experiments continental literary examples pragmatic everyday life as a litmus test and Nietzschean aphoristic style attitude problem elements Hell I m almost loathe to call it philosophy at all It s like a gorgeous dense glittering puzzle box I guarantee that when I read it again somewhere down the line I ll get something entirely different out of it Wittgenstein seems less concerned with presenting a systematic argument than in prodding the reader s mind This book is too complex to summarize but here is a nutshell If you want to know the meaning of a word consider how the word is used Words are used in a variety of language games interactions among people which display amily resemblances That used Words are used in a variety of language games interactions among people which display amily resemblances That there is no single model which shows the essence of how words are used but rather there are many overlapping and differing language games each of which is a different modelEnough summarizing Now to what I am interested in what I called once before Wittgenstein s behaviorism which I didn t like After reading the Philosophical Investigations I have come to the conclusion that Wittgenstein is not nearly as behavioristic as I had thought In act he is the most introspective behaviorist th. Rporates many hundreds of changes to Anscombe’s original translation Footnoted remarks in the earlier editions have now been relocated in the textWhat was previously referred to as ‘Part 2’ is now republished as Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment and all the remarks in it are nu. ,

If you read irst Wittgenstein s Tractatus and then ollow it with his Philosophical Investigations you will treat yourself to perhaps the most ascinating intellectual development in the history of philosophy Wittgenstein has the distinct merit of producing not one but two enormously influential systems of philosophy systems over that are at loggerheads with one another In act I wouldn t recommend attempting to tackle this work without irst reading the Tractatus as the Investigations is essentially one long refutation and critiue of his earlier conventional views But because I wish to give a short summary of some of Wittgenstein s later views here I will What Every American Should Know About the Rest of the World first give a little pr cise of the earlier work In the Tractatus Wittgenstein argues that language has one primaryunction to state I Got a New Friend facts Language is a logical picture of the world A given proposition mirrors a given state of affairs This leads Wittgenstein to regard a great many types of utterances as strictly nonsense For example since ethics is not any given state of affairs language couldn t possible picture it therefore all propositions in theorm of action X is morally good are nonsense Wittgenstein honestly believed that this solved all the problems of philosophy Long standing problems about causation truth the mind goodness beauty etc were all attempts to use language to picture something which it could not because beauty truth etc are not states of affairs Philosophers only need stop the attempt to transcend the limits of language and the problems would disappear In his words The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem After publishing this work and taking leave of professional philosophy as he thought it had been dealt with Wittgenstein began to have some doubts Certain everyday uses of language seemed hard to account The Real Lincoln: A New Look at Abraham Lincoln, His Agenda, and an Unnecessary War for if you regarded language as purely a truth stating tool These doubts eventually culminated in a return to Cambridge and to philosophy His posthumously published Investigations represents theullest expression of his later views So what are these views Well Experiencing the Resurrection: The Everyday Encounter That Changes Your Life first let us compare the styles of the two works The writing in both the Tractatus and the Investigations is extraordinary Wittgenstein is one of the veryinest writers of philosophy in a league with Nietzsche and Plato He uses almost no technical terms and very simple sentence structures yet his phrases can stick in the mind or months years after irst reading them Just the other day I was having a conversation with my German tutor about learning a oreign language To something I said she responded Die Grenzen meiner Spracher bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt The limits of my language are the limits of my world a uote rom the Tractatus Although the writing in both works is eually compelling the structures are uite different In the Tractatus Wittgenstein s argument is unified complete he even numbers his sentences as primary secondary and tertiary in terms of their importance to the argument In that work we can clearly see the influence of Bertrand Russell s logicism language is reduced to logical propositions and the argument is organized along logical grounds The reader of the Investigations will encounter something uite different Wittgenstein writes in similarly terse aphorisms he even retains a numbering system Babes in Toyland: The Making and Selling of a Rock and Roll Band for his points each individual point getting its own numbered paragraph The numbering of these paragraphs however is cumulative and does not express anything about their significance to his larger design It is almost as if Wittgenstein wrote down his thoughts on numberedlash cards and simply constructed the book by moving the The Meaning of Star Trek flash cards around Unlike the Tractatus which resolves itself into a unified whole the Investigations isragmentary I begin with style because the contrast in writing is a clue to the differences in thought between the earlier and later works Unlike the Tractatus the Investigations is rather a collection of observations and ideas The spirit of Wittgenstein s later enterprise is anti systematic rather than systematic Wittgenstein aims not at erecting a whole edifice of thought but at destroying other edifices Thus the text jumps rom topic to topic without any explicit connections or transitions now attacking one common philosophical idea now another The experience can often be exasperating since Wittgenstein is being intentionally obliue rather than direct In the words of John Searle experience can often be exasperating since Wittgenstein is being intentionally obliue rather than direct In the words of John Searle the Investigations "is like getting a kit or a model airplane without any "like getting a kit or a model airplane without any or how to put it together Let me attempt to put some of these pieces together at least the pieces that were especially useful to me Wittgenstein replaces his old picture metaphor with a new tool metaphor Instead of a word being meaningful because it pictures a Frommer's Irreverent Guide to Walt Disney World fact the meaning of a word is at least most of the time synonymous with the social use of that word For example the word pizza does not mean pizza because it names theood rather it means pizza because you can use the word to order the ood at a restaurant So instead of the reference to a type of object being primary the social use is primary This example reveals a general uality of Wittgenstein s later thought the replacement of the objectivesubjective dichotomy with the notion of public social behavior Philosophers have traditionally posited theories of meaning that are either internal or external For example pizza can mean the particular ood either because the word points to the Dump Truck Trouble/Lets Build a Doghouse! food or because the word points to our idea or sensation of theood Either language is reporting objective states of affairs
Or Subjective Internal Experiences 
subjective internal experiences destroys the external argument with a very simple observation Take the word game If the external theory of meaning is correct the word game must mean what it does because it points to something essential about games But what is the essential uality that makes games games Is there any Some games are not social think of solitaire some games are not trivial think of the Olympic Games some games are not conseuence Sometime After Midnight free think of compulsive gambling and some games are social trivial and conseuenceree Is a game something that you play But you also play records and trombones So what is the essential single uality of game that our word refers to Wittgenstein says there isn t any Rather the word game takes on different meanings in different social contexts or modes of discourse Wittgenstein calls these different modes of discourse language games Some examples of language games are that of mimicking of joking of mourning of philosophizing of religious discourse Every language game has its own rules therefore any proposed all encompassing theory of language like Wittgenstein s own Tractatus will Stop Inflammation Now!: A Step-By-Step Plan to Prevent, Treat, and Reverse Inflammation--The Leading Cause of Heart Disease and Related Conditions fail because it attempts to reduce the irreducible You cannot reduce chess soccer solitaire black jack and tag to one set of rules the same is true says Wittgenstein of language Another popular theory of meaning is the internal theory This theory holds that propositions mean things by referring to thoughts or sensations When I refer to pain I am referring to an internal object when I refer to a bunny I am referring to a set of visual sensations that I have learned to call bunny Wittgenstein makes short work of this argument too Let s start with the argument about sensations Wittgenstein points out that our sensations of an object say a bunny are not something that we experience as it were purely Rather our interpr. Incorporating significant editorial changesrom earlier editions the Eyes Behind the Lines: L Company Rangers in Vietnam, 1969 fourth edition of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is the definitive enace German English version of the most important work of 20th century philosophy The extensively revised English translation inco. ,